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Rethinking Urban Projects: Experiences in Europe

Willem Salet

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Abstract

This article investigates how decision-making processes relating to strategic urban projects are framed in order to achieve innovative urban developments. Three dimensions of framing are analysed: the cognitive framing, the framing of alliances in the metropolitan action space and the framing of the democratic process. The crux for success is in organising interconnectivity between the dimensions of framing in a multiactor and multilevel context. The model’s assumptions are tested by an application to four of Europe’s largest urban projects under construction.

Introduction

In the 1990s, large mixed-use urban projects were launched in almost every metropolitan region of Europe, but it is still rare to find positive results regarding the innovative integration of the economic, social and sustainable objectives. The fascination for the ambitious planning endemic to this type of strategic project, on the one hand, and the somewhat disappointing performances, on the other hand, have led to the central question of this article: how are the civic, economic and public transactions that underlie the planning visions of urban mega-projects framed? A related question is: how is institutional capacity mobilised to bring together the aims of integrative planning projects with actual social dynamics (Healey, 2007)? This query contains two dimensions. First, do the frames of mobilised action underlying the projects adequately support the mission of the project in question? The second and more structural question relates to whether these frames of public action are adequately embedded in real social dynamics. Successful planning of integrative urban projects is no easy task. It requires the convergence of civic, economic and political action. It runs the risk of either running into a kind of ‘planning voluntarism’ by local planners or the opposite but also unsatisfying possibility of ‘market domination’ (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). On the other hand, there is also the risk of becoming imprisoned in narrow interrelationships: the neocorporatist trap of creating public–private...
partnerships whose mutual property interests become virtually omnipotent is a real possibility for urban mega-projects (Moulaert et al., 2001; Jouve and Lefèvre, 2002). Active civic involvement must prevent one-dimensional forms of hegemony from occurring.

Successful strategies, furthermore, depend on effective co-ordination of collective action in an increasingly fragmented metropolitan arena that consists of the single-issue interests of manifold public and private actors. They also need to overcome single-issue coalitions of interest and power. Successful integration and innovation of collective preferences is neither self-evident nor even probable. It requires intelligent strategies of framing (including shared visions, coalitions of action and civic involvement) in a world populated by fragmentary coalitions of power and interest. It also requires that institutional innovation occur by breaking through barriers of sectoral, single-issue approaches typical of statutory governmental agencies.

Finally, the framing of urban mega-projects must be positioned in a context of urban and institutional change. Urbanisation processes have undergone a revolution since the emergence of the knowledge society in the early 1990s. The multiplicity of space generates a reconfiguration of flows of space and territorial coherence. All over urban Europe, the traditional shape of monocentric urban systems is being transformed into a complex mosaic of polycentric urban configurations (Ascher, 1995, 2001; Sieverts, 2003). Urban mega-projects are increasingly situated on the urban fringe in major economic and transport corridors and in the proximity of airports and other nodes of non-place-bounded flows. Here, the risks of insulation and monocentrism are manifest. The processes of urban transformation are still in a state of becoming, at times unbalanced and sometimes even separating (Graham and Marvin, 2001). Urban mega-projects, themselves a part of these urban transformation processes, are often considered strategic vehicles for creating better-balanced urbanisation patterns and promoting urban integration.

Further, shifting conditions in the institutional context also challenge the framing of urban mega-projects. Although these projects are situated locally, their sphere of influence has multiplied dramatically in the past 15 years. Processes of decentralisation and recentralisation in the post-administrative state are producing a continuous rescaling of interrelationships in the metropolitan arena (Brenner et al., 2003). This is with regard to not only the networks of action of those involved in project decisions, but also broader intergovernmental relationships. Large urban projects can no longer be considered as local projects since their size is embedded in frames of multi-actor and multilevel governance. These institutional conditions call for a new multiplicity of action. Local projects are increasingly framed in interregional, transnational and international networks of lobbying and decision-making. The key to success lies in the capability of organising interconnectivity between the different spheres of public and private action at different scalar levels (Salet et al., 2003).

This article builds on the results of the EU-sponsored research programme ‘Competitive Metropolises’ (COMET) that investigated, for seven metropolitan regions in Europe, growth perspectives for advanced service sectors, competitiveness and sustainability, and the implications for planning (for its full findings, see Salet and Gualini, 2006). Before presenting the empirical findings, we will briefly discuss the recent scientific literature on strategic urban projects and present our frame of analysis.

The Current Debate on Large Urban Projects

Urban studies have a long tradition of analysing the societal and political significance of
strategic urban projects and investigating their impact on urban and regional systems. In a recent overview, Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) analysed the shifting coalitions behind strategic urban projects in the different stages of post-war modernisation in American cities. The unequivocal pro-growth coalitions advocating new highways and new central business districts during the 1950s and 1960s encountered a social polarisation debate at the end of the 1960s. Issues like social inequality, racism, poor education and unemployment began to dominate the urban agenda, penetrating the coalitions for strategic urban projects. Social housing, urban innovation, public transport, and—after the energy crisis in the early 1970s—environmental projects rose in prominence on the urban agenda, while economic projects became encapsulated in social and political coalitions. After this socially dominated stage of urban growth, the necessity of an economic renaissance reintroduced economic-oriented projects (such as airports and large sites for businesses) to the urban agenda. Public choice theories underpinned the need for the decentralisation of economic allocation policies (Peterson, 1981, 1995). The coalitions behind the major urban projects were adapted correspondingly. In the 1990s, the strategic coalitions did not return to their outspokenly pro-growth stance of the 1950s and 1960s, however. Urban planners and private-sector developers now understand the ability of urban protest-groups to mobilise social and political power (and to take legal action) and they generally avoid overt conflict with urban groups. As a result, economic growth has been compromised in the current stage of urban development. Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) label the current era of strategic projects in American cities as the ‘do no harm’ era. Urban government limits itself to enabling, preferring to avoid direct conflict. Consequently, new urban mega-projects are increasingly being realised in relatively ‘conflict-free’ zones at the urban periphery or in decayed urban areas that would welcome any kind of investment.

The process of encapsulating and thus mitigating the power of economic interests in urban coalitions has been observed in the literature since the early 1980s. Observers have still found regimes of economic hegemony, but this is expressed indirectly in ‘concessionary’ or ‘conserving’ relationships (Fainstein et al., 1983). Urban regime theories refer to these as ‘political/economic regimes’ that combine economic and social coalitions (Logan and Molotch, 1987; Stone, 1989; Mollenkopf, 1992; DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1999). So, the involvement of urban groups and the urban electorate can affect urban growth. The development-driven principle of fiscal accountability is countervailed (in some places more intensely than in others) by policies designed to please the electorate (Elkin, 1985). Comparative studies of American and European cities by Savitch and Kantor stress the increased significance of balancing. They point to the significance of ‘negotiated interests’: cities may be dependent on the international marketplace and their flows of investment, but they still manage to negotiate for more balanced results (Savitch and Kantor, 2002; Hambleton et al., 2002). In our model of framing (in the next section), we will follow these experiences. Local responsiveness to globalisation certainly ‘does matter’ and does ‘make a difference’. In addition to this, a more structural consequence of the ‘multiplication of urban space’ is that local responsiveness is in need of multiplication itself. Here, we will deliberately embrace a multilevel perspective in local policy-making. Urban planning in the network society is no longer a matter of local and regional planners or locally based coalitions, but requires a strategic response of interconnectivity. The key to strategic planning and project framing in the network society lies in the quality of interconnectivity.
In Europe, post-war urbanisation processes were less dramatic than their US equivalents in at least two respects. First, the urbanisation tendencies of American regions generally came to Europe 5–10 years later. Secondly, these tendencies occurred almost nowhere in Europe as intensely as in the American market society. Even in the 1950s, European cities were more accustomed to social intervention by the government. This is why strategic urban projects in American urban regions are usually more dominated by private-sector coalitions. However, urban Europe has also witnessed the rebirth of the ‘entrepreneurial city’ since the mid 1980s after the social époque came to a close. Eventually, the process of economic liberalisation triumphed everywhere in Europe.

Under the new urban entrepreneurialism of the 1990s, many urban regions in Europe felt urged to generate more internal coherence and partnerships (public and private) in order to face external competition (Swyngedouw et al., 2002). Increasingly, large urban and regional projects are used to pave the way towards regionalisation and competitiveness. Furthermore, mixed-use strategies have been devised to balance out the economic, social and ecological objectives of these projects. The aspirations to mix these objectives in combined perspectives have been observed so frequently in local strategic planning and urban mega-projects that they were labelled as ‘the new conventional wisdom’ in a recent British oversight study (Buck et al., 2005). However, these researchers also concluded that the often-assumed concordance of economic competitiveness, social cohesion and regional governance is easier ‘said’ than ‘done’. The divergence of social, economic and ecological outcomes is an issue in European appraisals of strategic urban projects (Bassett et al., 2002; Turok and Edge, 1999; Gordon, 1999; Kazepov, 2004). Recent planning literature in Europe has become a bit sceptical, with regard to both the outcomes of the projects and the underlying coalitions. In an EU-sponsored comparative study on this type of project, it was concluded that the mixed character of European urban mega-projects is usually overshadowed by a domination of economic functions. Moulaert et al. (2001) conclude that most strategic urban mega-projects now under construction are dominated by the narrow ‘neo-liberal’ aspirations of the entrepreneurial city and warn against ‘new élite formations’. The authors also decry the lack of democracy and social policy in new urban development policies and the poor integration of large urban projects in wider urban processes and planning systems (Swyngedouw et al., 2002; Moulaert et al., 2003; see Graham and Marvin, 2003, for similar observations).

Drawing on both American and European urban analyses on the institutional capacity of strategic urban projects and the underlying strategies in coalition-building, it seems safe to say that the political ambitions of innovative integration cannot be achieved easily. In our model of analysis, we will be aware of possible divergences of intentions and outcomes and of the imbalances in power. However, unlike the assumptions in some critical studies, we will not consider private-sector participation in strategic urban projects as a matter of self-evidence. Private investments never are a matter of certainty; dominance of capital may be problematic, but if it is absent even larger deficiencies may occur in the aimed integration of urban perspectives. The analytical model must be alert to the possibilities for different occurrences.

**The Framing Model**

What model of analysis underlies the examination of framing projects? The methodological foundations of ‘frame studies’ go back to Goffman’s book *Frame Analysis* in
the early 1970s, although since then many different roads have been taken (Goffman, 1974). Goffman constructed frame analysis as a structural sociological analysis of the principles of organisation guiding the ways in which men may perceive the real world. He considered frames as cognitive schemes that enable individuals to perceive and represent the world in certain ways and to act upon these perceptions. These schemes of perception give meaning to social occurrences; they enable people to identify what is going on. It is important to note that Goffman’s frames are not introduced as deliberate strategic notions which serve to achieve specified ends. Rather, frames have evolved over time in the course of social interaction and serve as a sort of structural framework which enables the identification of new occurrences. Contemporary frame analysis, by contrast, usually focuses on the intentional and conscious development of frames. This is why in most recent approaches the description ‘frame analysis’ is replaced by the more active sense of ‘framing analysis’, indicating the drives that are to select and to mobilise collective action. (See the various approaches of framing analysis in media studies (d’Angelo, 2002; Scheufele, 1999), in theories of social mobilisation (Benford and Snow, 2000) and in planning and policy studies (Schon and Rein, 1994; Triandafyllidou and Fotiou, 1998).) In our examination of urban mega-projects, we are interested in the active sense of framing, as frame development apparently is an important stage in the genesis of strategic projects. We are well aware, however, that processes of construction simultaneously are processes of ‘reconstruction’, as certainly in the negotiation of new frames of collective action individuals and groups are urged to redefine and to reflect upon the existing cognitive schemes of perception. Typically, in framing processes which are analysed as processes of reconstruction, the role of conflicts may be beneficial in negotiating innovative schemes of perception (Rein and Laws, 2000). Contesting frames can function to “amplify and extend existing ideologies or provide innovative antidotes to them” (Snow and Benford, 1992, p. 4). In our analysis of prognostic frame construction and reconstruction, we will focus on the active side of framing, defining the new cognitive schemes which intend to mobilise collective action. The articulation of these strategic frames “involves the connection and alignment of events and experiences so that they hang together in a relatively unified and compelling fashion” (Benford and Snow, 2000, p. 623). “Amplification is highlighting some issues as more salient than others” (Benford and Snow, 2000, p. 623).

In strategic urban projects, these strategic frames are usually marked in policy documents and written statements about the strategic intentions of the project, both in general strategic plans and in documents focusing on the project in casu.

The interrelationships between the ‘cognitive framing’ and the ‘framing of action’ must be explored in more detail. In their overview of current framing literature, Benford and Snow point out that negotiation of shared meaning is oriented on collective action. Collective action is to be aligned according to the negotiated schemes of shared cognition. Flexible and inclusive frames are expected to have a higher resonance than rigid and exclusive schemes of understanding. Resonance is needed for successful mobilisation. Resonance is expected to be in particular dependent on the salience and the credibility of the frame and the credibility of the “articulators” or “claims makers” (Benford and Snow, 2000, p. 619). In other words, the focus of the contemporary social mobilisation studies in the framing literature is on the shared cognitive processes and their potential direct impact on collective action. In the context of planning and policy-making, however, the relationships between cognitive framing and collective
action are very complicated and far less direct. The institutional context brings in a variety of intermediating institutional conditions (Triandafyllidou and Fotiou, 1998). Also, Schon and Rein (1994) explicitly decide to make an analytical distinction between the cognitive processes of framing and the framing of collective action processes, although most of their concern goes to the cognitive ways of mind setting which intractable policy controversies can be reconciled. In our model of framing analysis, we will build forward on the analytical distinction of framing cognitive schemes and framing collective action because we do not expect an automatic alignment between these distinguished spheres of framing and certainly not in the highly dynamic context of metropolitan transformation. The world of action is not always orchestrated as collective action and it is not always guided by frames of shared cognition (not even if the conflicts of framing are successfully solved in the realm of cognition). Framing collective action itself is a very complicated challenge. Certainly with respect to our subject of investigation, the framing of mega-projects in metropolitan regions, one has to be aware of the splintering interests, mindsets and powers and the changeable configuration of action spaces. For this analytical reason, we prefer to investigate the action space as a distinguished dimension of framing and to examine in empirical studies whether and how the cognitive dimension and the action dimension of framing do correlate. Under the conditions of the network society, the action space for strategic urban projects has become more articulated and differentiated in the context of multi-actor and multilevel governance. The scope of action has been multiplied and mobilised as a consequence of rescaling processes. Strategic urban projects no longer may be analysed as ‘local’ projects nor as ‘government-led’ projects. The key to strategic planning in the network society lies in the quality of interconnectivity (Salet et al., 2003). Urban planning strategies have to connect different spheres of action: private-sector realms of action, interregional and international governmental spheres of action and, finally, inner-regional spheres of action (Salet et al., 2003). This certainly goes for ambitious projects that aim at the integration of economic, social and ecological qualities (‘urban use value’ instead of purely ‘commercial value’ using the magnetic terms of Lefebvre) which require the cross-cutting framing of collective action through four different domains of activity (Lefebvre, 1991).

The metropolitan action space may be globally distinguished in different domains of activity

1. the civic domain of activities (citizenship, local groups, international cultures);
2. the private sector (often embedded in national or international functional networks);
3. the interrelationships of public and private actors within the local metropolitan arena; and
4. the transregional domain of external governmental programmes and interrelationships.

The intriguing question is how coalitions of action are forged within and between the different domains of the metropolitan action space. It is useful to investigate the different kinds of transactions that underlie the decision-making in strategic urban projects. Is the frame of decision-making publicly led or privately led? Do private-sector corporations co-operate with other organisations in strategies of collective action, or do they simply pursue their own self-interest, leaving public responsibilities up to the government? If joint partnerships are established, do such coalitions serve the business interests of both private and public bodies, or do they contain an innovative integration of the two?
What kinds of private actors are involved in decision-making: just economic interests, or cultural and civic interests as well, and in what kind of structure of representation? Also, the recent differentiation of intergovernmental relationships enables the emergence of fresh alliances (external relationships between cities and regions, between cities, regions, national and international programmes) with a strong impact on local projects. In a period of 15 years, an amazing variety of co-operating and conflicting coalitions has emerged in the development of European city-regions. The increase in size and scope and the increasing dynamics of the metropolitan action space have a strong impact on the conditions of framing collective action strategies.

The third and final dimension of our model of framing analysis relates to the arrangement of democratic participation. The relevant issue here is how civic groups are involved in the development of frames and how they might act as ‘frame articulators’ and ‘claims makers’ (Benford and Snow, 2000). One might expect formal procedures of participation in the initial stage of the project. It is important to investigate whether only the formal required procedures of hearing are taken into account or if—besides or in addition to these regular forms—active experiments of informal civic involvement also come to the fore. Further, we are interested to find in which stages democratic involvement is occurring, as the development of urban mega-projects usually extends through long trajectories of 25–30 years.

To conclude, our model of explaining the framing of projects is summarised in Table 1.

## Selection of Cases

In seven European metropolitan regions, we selected the largest, area-based projects that aim to connect the regional economy to global networks in the field of advanced (tertiary or quaternary) service sectors. Two criteria we used are size and density: the plans must call for at least 20 000 jobs at a density of at least 12 workplaces per hectare. Also, projects must aim to integrate urban functions (mixed-use developments). More specifically, the area should represent enough critical mass of location potential to exert a considerable impact on the spatial and environmental organisation of the region. For this reason, the location conditions of the site should be capable of supporting high-quality infrastructure connections and combining multiple urban activities. Finally, construction should be advanced enough to enable a thorough analysis of the trajectories of coalition formation. We deliberately did not select—alleged or expected—‘success stories’, neither did we expect to find unequivocal success stories, given the ambitious scope of the analytical framework. On the

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<th>Table 1. Model of framing in three dimensions</th>
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<td>Framing in three dimensions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Framing cognitive schemes</td>
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<td>Framing alliances in metropolitan action space through four domains</td>
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<tr>
<td>Framing democratic participation</td>
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contrary: the various cases proved more successful than others in certain respects, but not in others, thus indicating the ways according to which these and other projects may learn from each other. A structured questionnaire served as guide to the analysis of the case studies. Furthermore, some 80 interviews were held with key figures in the seven city-regions in order to deepen the understanding of the analytical findings. The interviewees were selected from the private sector, the government, the non-governmental sector (i.e. functional organisations, or quangos: quasi-administrative non-governmental organisations) with ties to urban economic and spatial development (such as railway companies, infrastructure management agencies, port authorities, land management agencies and housing associations) and, finally, well-informed members of civil society (such as academics, journalists and community groups).

In this paper, the analysis of case studies will be limited to four projects: Amsterdam: Plan Zuidas; Barcelona: Universal Forum of Cultures 2004; Berlin: Adlershof; and Copenhagen: Ørestaden.

Analysis of the Cases

Amsterdam: Plan Zuidas

Amsterdam Zuidas is the top office location of the Netherlands and contains (both in size and economic specialisation) the most prestigious office space in the country. Since its official start as a ‘key project’ in 1997, its development has been carried by the internationally focused financial and legal service sectors. Situated on the southern ring road of Amsterdam, it is directly connected by rail and highway to Schiphol Airport and is not far from the historical city centre. The location takes full advantage of the region’s economic and social network space. The strategic position will be improved further by the arrival of the high-speed train in 2008 and the completion of the ‘north–south line’ of the Amsterdam metro in 2011. The use of this strategic area as a development district has a turbulent history. The existence of a pro-growth climate is not self-evident in Amsterdam: it took the city over two decades to find new concordance with the market sector. This occurred unwillingly in the 1970s and somewhat more willingly in the era of urban crisis in the mid 1980s—but planning a large development in sensitive inner-city space along the River IJ remained controversial. Finally, in the mid 1990s, the city planners decided to follow decentralising market preferences and move to the urban ring after the inner-city waterfront project failed to materialise as envisioned. The decision of the major multinational Amsterdam-based ABN/AMRO Bank to merge its various scattered offices into new headquarters at the Zuidas signalled a breakthrough in this process.

At first, this led to the development of a top segment of the market at the Zuidas and was supported by a coalition of interested stakeholders (also including the second major Dutch bank ING) and it was only marginally regulated by a suddenly very modest municipal planning department. Public involvement revived a few years later. In 1998, the city designed the first master plan for the Zuidas; this called for promoting economic development but also included an ambition of mixed-use aimed at creating ‘urban space’ in addition to ‘economic space’. The zoning of residential space was a crucial condition for achieving a vibrant centre, but housing development was hampered by the heavy rail and highway infrastructure cross-cutting the area. The option to bury the infrastructure under the ground created the opportunity for additional housing and facilities. Since the planners first introduced this option in 1999, the ambitions for mixed uses have increased further. In the first 1998 masterplan, the programme for offices, housing and facilities

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was still dominated by offices (65 per cent, 21 per cent and 14 per cent respectively). After introducing the underground option, the planning programme taken up in the Zuidas Vision of 2001 is much more balanced: 44 per cent offices, 44 per cent housing and 12 per cent facilities. The results of the building programme of the Zuidas project over the first seven-year period are shown in Table 2.

As all development is situated at the sides of a large infrastructure artery, the crucial condition to achieve the desired ‘centrality of varied urban space’ is the decision on the ‘dock model’ to bury the infrastructure. The model entails a 1.2 km tunnel to enable integrated urban use above it. Until now, mainly office space has been realised along the highways; the first residential plans are under construction at the outskirts of the area. The ‘urban use’ function has become dependent on the infrastructure restructuring. The local public and private partners have co-operated in this ambitious trajectory, which is a large project in itself. In early 2005, the central government, represented by five ministries, signed its intention to join this local partnership and agreed to search for practical solutions to the implementation of the dock model. At present, negotiations between the partners are being held regarding the feasibility of the dock project, the shared responsibilities, the distribution of risks and the organisation of the long-term operation.

The patterns of framing the project according to the three dimensions of our model will now be analysed briefly. The framing of cognitive schemes started with autonomous initiatives by the private sector to concentrate the financial headquarters on a new site in the urban periphery. As the site turned in a few years into the economic hotspot of the region, the cognitive schemes in the private sector evolved into the ambition of developing a business centre of international allure, facing the increasing economic competition between urban regions. When the city planners joined the stage, a new frame of shared cognition was negotiated aiming at the development of a vibrant urban centre based on the concept of ‘multiple use of land’. The economic discourse of ‘commercial value’ made place for integrated ambitions to create real ‘values of urban land use’. The official meaning of the negotiated cognitive schemes is established in the 1998 masterplan of the project.

The second dimension of framing addresses the question: how is the cognitive framing aligned with the framing of action via alliances in the metropolitan action space? The economic functions were strongly pushed forward by private sector investment. In a few years, the area has grown into one of Europe’s elite economic spaces. The voluminous growth in office space is a bit contested as the Zuidas aims to attain 9.8 per cent of the regional real estate market (already having 3.8 per cent),

Table 2. Building programme of the Zuidas project (in square metres)

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Housing</th>
<th>Offices</th>
<th>Facilities</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Realised since 1998</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>137 000</td>
<td>7 500</td>
<td>144 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction phase</td>
<td>37 700</td>
<td>111 600</td>
<td>18 600</td>
<td>167 900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation phase</td>
<td>170 000</td>
<td>174 250</td>
<td>75 170</td>
<td>419 420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study phase (medium-term)</td>
<td>93 750</td>
<td>78 000</td>
<td>43 800</td>
<td>215 550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study phase (long-term)</td>
<td>772 250</td>
<td>620 750</td>
<td>163 450</td>
<td>1 556 450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Zuidas, excluding Free University</td>
<td>1 073 700</td>
<td>1 121 700</td>
<td>308 520</td>
<td>2 503 920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free University</td>
<td>18 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>176 500</td>
<td>244 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total development potential</td>
<td>1 091 700</td>
<td>1 171 700</td>
<td>485 020</td>
<td>2 748 420</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: City of Amsterdam (2004, p. 20).
while at the same time vacant office space is increasing. On the other hand, the Zuidas only marginally competes with other sites in the region since it is generated by (and competes with) international networks. Beyond economic relationships, however, the involvement of the private sector is rather marginal. There is no evidence of strong pressure by cultural or social agents in this project. In particular, the involvement of the housing market stakeholders was modest in the first 10 years. Only at the fringes one can find a small increase in already-existing housing areas, university buildings and also some new cultural facilities (such as museums and entertainment). Regarding the involvement of supra-regional public policies, the recent and direct involvement of the central government is a new and important factor—in particular with respect to the financing of the infrastructure (such as the dock, the station and high-speed train connection). Thus, local–central connections might improve. However, there is no evidence of inter-regional policy-making, and no connection with European or other international policies. This is astounding considering the scope of the activities and the high strategic international potential of the advanced services at Zuidas in combination with the main infrastructure ports of Europe. Vital issues like infrastructure and environmental quality are only framed in local (and recently local/national) settings of policy-making. Finally, within the sphere of inner-metropolitan relationships, the intermediary role of the province and the intermunicipal policy networks has been recognised only very recently by enabling the first arrangements for controlling intermunicipal rivalry on office development within the region.

Regarding the third dimension, the framing of democratic innovation, the project started with active debate and strong public involvement due to the controversies surrounding inner-city development. The migration of offices to the Zuidas pacified the public controversy on offices and generated a relatively constructive climate for debate on the new business centre. The decision on the 1998 masterplan enjoyed unanimous political support since the city-wide discussion over one of the main future urban centres of the region had been resolved. However, the silence of the urban population over the proceedings of the major urban project is not a sign of active democratic commitment. The case of Amsterdam Zuidas is analysed in more detail by Majoor (2006).

**Barcelona: Universal Forum of Cultures 2004**

Barcelona’s Universal Forum of Cultures covers a series of urban projects in the northeastern part of the city by means of an impressive imaging strategy. Actually, the forum is more of a cultural manifestation than a purely physical urban project. The manifestation is concentrated in a small area in the city (the Forum area), but its presence is used to stimulate a series of urban projects in the north-east. The cultural embedding of urban planning in Barcelona builds on the tradition of organising large cultural events of international allure in order to mobilise social and economic energy for a structural transformation of the urban fabric. Barcelona has a tradition of using world exhibitions, global sport events and mass cultural activities as vehicles for urban regeneration. The last great manifestation—the organisation of the Olympic Games in 1992—gave the sea back to the city and the present initiative attempts to complete this structural reform in an even larger way. In 2004, in co-operation with UNESCO, a self-created, universal forum of cultures was founded to rally support for regenerating various dilapidated parts of the city and to provide high-quality urban amenities. Over a four-month period, hundreds of international mass-events were organised, ranging from carnival parades to exhibitions,
forums for international students and world leaders, music festivals and other expressions of mass communication, art and entertainment. All this cultural energy was mobilised in order to create social consensus and momentum for a more structural spatial and economic transformation. In contrast to the North American business-oriented style of urban regeneration, Barcelona is promoting (and even exporting) a cultural style of strategic urban planning. It is doing this in an unconventional way, bringing together geopolitics, cultural policies, spatial planning and social and economic regeneration in loose integrative planning concepts. In addition to this mobilising style of cultural strategic planning, a businesslike operational management is used during the implementation phase (i.e. the designation of operational tasks by separating cultural events and physical operations; agencies operate relatively independently; there exists a businesslike way of dealing with building permissions; agencies are responsible for budgets).

Several urban projects have been endowed with this cultural impetus. The largest is the transformation of the decayed industrial area Poblenau into a new area of sophisticated, knowledge-intensive productivity (symbolised as @22). This 200-hectare area stretches along the sea to the north-eastern part of the city, close to the urban ring road. The industrial legacy of the area was in textiles and metalworking. Since the decline of these industries in the 1970s, it has been used for distributive functions and freight transport. Current plans aim to create a new centre for knowledge-intensive industries, such as IT, design, editorial production and cultural and audiovisual industries; this will be combined with residential, retail and entertainment functions. Regeneration began with an infrastructure project intended to connect the area to the metropolitan system. Economic regeneration is still in an embryonic stage, however. The plans simply indicate maximum rates of growth (with a huge ceiling of 2.6 million square metres of floorspace for offices, approximating to about 130 000 jobs, and a residential ceiling of 400 000 square metres). Maximum floorspace tells us little about what will really happen, however. In particular, the economic figures regarding offices and new employment (the only available official figures) cannot be considered realistic estimates. Barcelona's economy used to be strongly industrialised and the transformation to a service-sector economy in the past two decades still relies heavily on tourism and other consumption-based activities. The regional economy is still not well linked to international economic networks of the global knowledge economy. So, the high ambitions might also easily be overestimates.

Besides the Poblenau project, two of the most disadvantaged residential areas (La Catalana and La Mina) are scheduled for regeneration. The European Urban Programme sponsors plans for these areas. The city planners aim to improve the quality of life through new buildings, large public spaces and mixed-use facilities. Next, at Segrera Station a huge urban intensification is planned if the (again Europe-sponsored) high-speed train is to stop there. Finally, the urban project in the Forum area represents the transformation of neglected urban space into a new international centre for culture and communication. This 214-hectare area is well situated at the end of the famous Diagonal (the largest artery of the city which cross-cuts the whole urban grid) and provides the connection to the sea (Barcelona's gold coast). In the Forum area, a new convention centre with 15 000 seats and two auditoriums (3200 seats) are being built around a huge public space above a sanitation plant whose sustainable recycling method has also been praised by Europe for inventive sustainability policy. Many other facilities are also being provided for recreation...
and entertainment around the Esplanade (beaches and dunes, a yacht harbour, a new zoo, a health complex, hotels, retail, etc.).

The patterns of framing will be analysed briefly. The innovative framing of the Universal Forum of Cultures offers many inspiring elements for planning multipurpose projects in other cities. The cognitive framing is intensively used in order to mobilise action. Strikingly, cultural and urban design and international events are used to mobilise social and economic regeneration. Considering the next dimension of our model of explanation—the framing of alliances in the metropolitan action space—Barcelona still lacks interconnectivity in one important respect. Most projects for urban regeneration have been initiated by the public sector. The public sector, particularly the municipality, actively involved private actors with inventive methods and business-like implementation, but on the other side of the coin, Barcelona’s economy is not strongly positioned in international economic networks and the shifting hierarchies of the international knowledge economies that have been blossoming since the early 1990s. The project of urban transformation is not being pushed forward by the private sector and the intriguing question remains whether the innovative public methods will eventually seduce international and national capital to invest in Barcelona’s still-elusive knowledge economy. Regarding the supraregional public policies in urban regeneration, Barcelona belongs to the top category of metropolitan strategies. Although the links to the (semi-federal) Catalanian and the national government are rather complicated, Barcelona has managed to involve these tiers of government in co-operative coalitions in favour of the Forum project. It managed to do so by taking a leading role in interregional policy-making, European-level policy strategies and even global geopolitical strategies (for example, UNESCO and Latin American connections). Barcelona’s urban strategies start with a reflection on its position in global networks. Regarding the inner-metropolitan interrelationships, the relationship between the bottom–up concentration initiatives of the core city and the top–down tendencies towards polycentrism of the Catalanian government remain troublesome, but at present, these difficulties are being overcome by organising cultural events of international allure.

Finally, regarding the methodology of democratic innovation Barcelona has managed to raise public awareness and generate a variety of ideas about urbanisation in a global perspective at an early stage in the decision-making process. However, after selecting the policy alternatives, new controversies have flared up. For example, the planning authority seems to have failed to explain adequately to all social agents how a new global event will bring prosperity to the most disadvantaged communities instead of pushing them further to the outskirts of the metropolitan agglomeration. The Barcelona case is analysed in more detail by Luzon Benedicto and Vila Carrasco (2006).

Berlin Adlershof: The City of Science, Technology and Media

Under construction since 1994, the City of Science, Technology and Media Adlershof is Berlin’s largest urban development area. The site is strategically situated in the southeastern district of Treptow-Köpenick, in the new development axis to Schönefeld airport. It is already well connected to the city centre by train (12 km) and the completion of a direct 10-minute link with the airport is scheduled for 2010. Afterwards, a direct link with the urban ring road will be made. The technical specialisation of Adlershof is embedded in its industrial history. The roots of Germany’s first aerospace technology are in this area and Adlershof also served as a centre for technological research and development in the German Democratic Republic. In the DDR
period, three high-security complexes were situated in the area: the military state security agency, television production and the Academy of Science. These functions became increasingly obsolete after the unification of Germany in 1990 and the area ‘cried out for restructuring’. Shortly thereafter, the federal state of Berlin founded a developmental agency for the creation of a Park for Economy and Science and developed a vision for the entire area. Ambitions ran high in the years directly following unification: a complete urban transformation was envisioned which would generate 30,000 jobs and create a liveable city district with an urban quality of life and a balanced variety of urban uses. It was also decided to relocate part of the Humboldt University to Adlershof (in particular, the pure sciences, but later also the departments of Psychology and Geography).

The economic development comprises about 40 per cent of the huge 420-hectare site and is concentrated in three major complexes: commercial and non-commercial research in the city of science, the industrial park, and the television and media production in media city. The original plans zoned some 130 hectares for residential use (expecting about 15,000 inhabitants), while about 70 ha were reserved for mixed-use development and 70 more for green space (including the old airport). Although the development agencies still have high expectations, actual performance after the first decade is rather modest. There is some evidence of economic growth but the figures for 2004 show only 10,000 employed persons, while official documents had expected 20,000 in 2006. Still, the economy of this area is the fastest growing in this region of economic stagnation. Table 3 displays the situation in 2004.

The table also reveals the relatively large number of small and medium-sized enterprises. About 64 per cent of these were recently set up and only 14 per cent relocated from other parts of the city. Strikingly, almost no international firms or large national companies have settled in the area. Also, the initial

Table 3. Number of companies, scientific facilities and employees in Berlin Adlershof, 21 June 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thematic/functional areas of the development site</th>
<th>Companies or scientific facilities (in total)</th>
<th>Employees (approximate numbers)</th>
<th>Size (ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City of Science: non-university research institutes</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Science: technology-orientated companies and attached service-sector companies</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>3,220</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Science: Humboldt University with Departments of Mathematics and Natural Science and an information and communication centre</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>730</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media City: film and television-productions as well as services for post-production in the fields of cutting and copying, synchronisation, animation and image-processing, media workshops</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Park: companies in the service, trade and industry sectors</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>10,600</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

policy ambitions for residential use and retailing have been radically readjusted downwards (to only about 15 per cent of initial expectations).

How can the framing of Adlershof be analysed? Regarding the cognitive framing, the phrase ‘city of science, technology and media’ already symbolises the economic transformation aims. The economic mission is integrated with social and environmental perspectives, including urban centre development, housing, parts of the local university, retailing and an extensive green park. Adlershof is framed as a challenge of spatial integration.

The framing of coalitions in the metropolitan action space, however, does not match the discourse of spatial integration. The perspectives of action are rather one-sided. Adlershof is an example of a local public-sector-led urban project. In the private sector, there is only commitment from local entrepreneurs. Since the early 1990s, the regional economy of Berlin has experienced a rather troublesome period. The shifting hierarchies of international economic networks passed it by for the most part, and even national companies like Siemens partly left the region. Also, the geopolitical domain of active-transregional policies is notably absent. This would not immediately bring in new business, but an active profile in interregional, national and international policy-making might at least promote better conditions for economic growth. Although situated in the heart of central Europe, Berlin does not serve as a European model for border-crossing regions. Adlershof was not even given priority in national urban and regional policies. So, the progress of the project is primarily dependent on the convergence of inner-metropolitan coalitions. Here, a relatively strong interconnectivity has been arranged between the worlds of science and enterprise. Evidence suggests that many recently settled enterprises are well connected to the organisations of scientific and commercial research, particularly the exact sciences. Regarding the embedding of economic growth in mixed-use activities, the results are still very modest. There has been a more or less latent rivalry between the ‘economic development’ and ‘urban planning’ coalitions, both led from different divisions of the federal state of Berlin. Formally, the establishment of an overarching agency for the project development should have ended this rivalry. However, there is no evidence of active involvement of social and economic organisations in the further development of the project; this also goes for the involvement of civic participation. The Berlin-Adlershof case is analysed in more detail by Bachman (2006).

Copenhagen Ørestaden

Ørestaden is a major urban development scheme, centrally located between the old city centre of Copenhagen and the international airport. The idea behind the initiative is to create a ‘city annex’, which will attract national and international investors. The type of project is comparable with Amsterdam Zuidas and Berlin Adlershof. In addition to the location, the attractiveness of the area is its good accessibility from all parts of the Øresund region by motorway, rail and metro. Also, its location next to a major green area is considered an asset. The area has the form of a long rectangle with a width of 600 metres and a length of 5 kilometres (for this reason, it has been dubbed ‘the tie’). The area is served by a newly built, fully automated metro, which has six stops in the area. In total, the area comprises 310 hectares, a third of which is green space that contains small ponds providing habitats for endangered species.

In June 1992, the ‘Act on Ørestad’ was passed in the Parliament. This was the first Act of Parliament for 30 years where the state was involved in a major new urban development. According to the Act, the development corporation Ørestadsselskabet I/S, co-owned by the City of Copenhagen and the Ministry of Finance, would develop ‘Ørestad’ in an
area jointly owned by the two parties. Similar organisational constructions had been applied a few times before, but within the realm of Danish urban development it represented an organisational innovation. The Act stated that Ørestad Development Corporation is empowered to plan the area and provide the required land improvement and infrastructure, most notably a railway. This eventually became a fully automated metro running on an elevated track through most of Ørestaden. The capacity to invest in the metro is ensured by a provision allowing the Ørestad Development Corporation to obtain loans on the international financial market. By improving the accessibility of the area, the price of the building sites would rise and the development corporation would then be able to repay the loans. Along with the organisational innovation, this represents a financial innovation in Danish urban development.

The Act also stipulated that the Ørestad Development Corporation produce a master plan. Consequently, the Municipal Plan for Copenhagen, which was revised in 1993, only included very broad descriptions of future developments in the Ørestad. The master plan presented by the Ørestad Development Corporation in 1995 followed the general ideas of a Finnish first prize entry in a competition held a year before—including a winding canal in the northern part of the Ørestad. The master plan was incorporated in the revision of the Municipal Plan in 1996. The master plan laid out priorities according to which the ‘University District’ in the north and ‘Ørestad District’, where the international transport corridor to the Fixed Link to Sweden intersects with the metro line, would be developed first. Developments are now occurring in both areas, especially in the University District. The two other districts will be developed later. The Ørestad Development Corporation has taken on the role of initiator while the City of Copenhagen is the planning authority. The metro opened in October 2002. When the project is finished, land use in the area will be 60 per cent commercial, 20 per cent residential and 20 per cent retail, education, culture, services and leisure facilities.

Reviewing the three dimensions of our model, the cognitive framing of the Ørestaden plan may be described as a clear example of the new urban entrepreneurialism which has made a revival in a number of urban regions since the early 1990s. The cognitive frame is negotiated into a multifunctional model, aiming at a variety of urban functions (offices, university, retailing, housing, an extensive green site). The project office successfully managed to bring in the university as one of the social stakeholders, along with housing organisations and the landscapers of the green site. The retailing is concentrated in a monstrous mega-centre. Although multiple functions are framed and successfully arranged in the area, the spatial planning concept did not integrate the various functions in a concept of vibrant urban diversity. Strong separation of different land uses has hampered full integration—the concept of urban design is a serial accumulation of monofunctional activities.

The framing of alliances in the metropolitan action space rests in particular on public-sector policies, on the consultation of representative and intermediating consultative bodies and on the social organisations referred to earlier. The missing link is the development of offices. The public-sector-led planning is not adequately linked with the individual stakeholders in the private sector and their international economic networks. Although the chamber of commerce and other consultative bodies, representing the private sector, strongly support investment by the local government in the economy, the private sector itself is almost completely absent. It appears to prefer other locations of economic investment. The Ørestaden site even had to decide to
reduce quality standards and rent levels in order to compete with other sites in the region. More successful are the attempts of the urban and regional planners to link the strategic perspectives of active transregional planning with the operational decision-making in the Ørestaden project. Indeed, the geopolitical strategic profiling of the project is exemplary. The border-crossing Copenhagen—Malmö connection is recognised as a European model region. It stimulated excellent economic conditions and attracted capital via co-matching public-sector arrangements that would not have been feasible without the external strategic profiling. The Ørestaden project itself benefited from the strategic planning alliances in the financing of particular aspects of the project—namely, the rapid light rail connection with the city and the airport.

Regarding the democratic organisation, the project purely followed the formal routines of participation. The technocratic approach of the plan is not much liked by the local population. There is evidence of opposition, but the progress of the project is effectively screened off from civic participation. The Copenhagen case is analysed in more detail by Majoor and Jørgensen (2006).

**Reflections on the Empirical Findings**

The empirical findings are not only relevant for the genesis of the individual cases, they may also generate input for the further conceptualisation of framing analysis. A permanent methodological search is needed in order to get more effective clues to assess and to compare the performances of different urban projects. Obviously, the negotiated visions, the discourses and the real conditions for action and civic involvement differ from project to project. This is why we are not searching for fixed goals or targets that were to be achieved in all strategic projects, but for the relevant cognitive and action dimensions of project framing that get different practical meaning in different settings but still make sense as relevant levels of generalisation in a wide array of strategic urban projects. In all strategic projects, very ambitious aims are raised with respect to the realisation and integration of various urban qualities in a very dynamic context of governance. The highly challenging concepts of integration make it urgent to find new solutions in a multiplied metropolitan action space that enables various coalitions between plural stakeholders at different levels of scale. The practices in individual projects might be inventive in developing new cognitive and action strategies, but they might be deficient and biased as well, and no single project will be able to pull out the full array of registers in the new metropolitan action space. In other words: the practices of framing in individual projects will differ strongly and professionals may learn from experiences in other projects. Distinguishing generalised dimensions may serve as a model for systematic investigation and frame reflection. In our cases, for instance, the cognitive and action framing in the cases of Berlin Adlershof and Amsterdam Zuidas might learn from the Barcelona and Copenhagen projects how to use the new action potential of transregional strategies for their own projects. The strategic potential of geopolitics (for instance, getting recognised as a European model project, learning and lobbying in interregional networks) is not actively used in the Amsterdam and Berlin projects. Vice versa, the Barcelona and Copenhagen cases might learn from the Amsterdam Zuidas experiences how important it is to base project planning on direct involvement of private-sector stakeholders instead of negotiation with intermediate representative bodies such as employers’ organisations or chambers of commerce. By systematically comparing the experiences of different projects on the generalised dimensions, researchers may detect typical biases in particular project settings. It may also help to identify local projects which
successfully manage to cope with the complicating tendencies of metropolitan multiplicity and increasing fragmentation.

In constructing the conceptual model of framing, we decided for analytical reasons to distinguish the cognitive dimension, the action dimension and the civic involvement dimension of framing. The distinction was made for analytical reasons (not real) because, due to many overlaps, it is difficult to grasp the sense of action if it is only loosely linked to vision or knowledge. Still, we decided to do so because, in complex processes with dynamic configurations of stakeholders and changeable conditions of negotiation, there may be divergences between the schemes of cognition and the coalitions of action. The empirical findings demonstrated even more radical evidence of diverging dimensions than the cautious analytical distinction. There appear to be real differences. The underlying alliances of collective action appear to differ strongly from the negotiated visions and shared cognitive schemes. In all projects under investigation, the enhancement of ‘economic competitiveness’ of the region was one of the major drives in the cognitive schemes of the project. The conditions of this economic mission were negotiated between the public sector, the civic groups and the spokesman of the business community, usually in an early stage. In contrast to the economy-loaded frames of cognition, however, the real economic stakeholders acted very modestly or even almost stayed away in three of the four cases. The direct involvement of business in Amsterdam Zuidas is the exception here, instead of being the rule. Next, it was astounding to conclude that, although the socially and culturally bounded character of economic development was negotiated in shared visions and discourses in all cases, the real social and cultural strategies of action thus far do not match the outspoken ambitions in three of the four projects. The cultural stakeholders are largely absent and, in so far as they are present, are not well integrated with the other activities (see the segregated planning of universities, housing and offices in Ørestaden or Adlershof). Only in the Barcelona case, has an innovative repertoire of cultural action unfolded that is capable of matching the cognitive frames. Apparently, there is a gap between the frames of cognition and the frames of action. Sharing visions, discourses and missions is not identical to the mobilisation of collective action.

The examination of active democratic legitimation, the third dimension of civic involvement in the model of explanation, may bring in the public ‘articulators’ and ‘claims makers’ of the negotiated schemes of cognition. Civic groups might be expected to protest when projects diverge from the negotiated cognitive frames—and certainly when ‘commercial value’ is produced where ‘urban use value’ was negotiated. In contested inner-city projects, the role of civic groups cannot be neglected. They sometimes even overact the role of articulation and claims making but—typically—in the examples of new centre development in the urban periphery, active democratic involvement is a scarcity. Here, after the initial rites and debates of public participation, the project is given into the professional hands of project organisation, at a safe distance from social and political articulation. This professional ‘gating’ was observed in all cases. Even the culturally and socially engaged project of Barcelona was organised at distance from civic groups. Having been turned into the outsiders of project framing, civic organisations sometimes fight back, as happened in
Barcelona where grass-root organisations strongly protested in the heyday of cultural project exposure! In other cases, civic groups have become almost indifferent to what happens in the inside world of these projects. The articulation of shared visions is not at all evident during the very long and changeable trajectories of project development. The project management is usually involved in contracting processes, bearing large financial risks, and is not likely to favour civic involvement and possible disturbances; it will consider civic engagement as a risk rather than as an asset. From the other side, public debate and civic participation might look away from the gated project and turn its attention to other parts of the city. Articulation of the negotiated schemes of cognition does not always occur spontaneously.

In addition to the processes of ‘articulating’ and ‘claiming’ the legitimate mission of a project, civic participation might be activated by mobilising the creative resources of local groups in the processes of development. Experiments in stimulating cultural entrepreneurship (‘outside-in’ instead of ‘inside-out’ organisation of creativity) are not yet common in current processes of project framing; we did not observe these experiments to a significant extent.

To Conclude

A three-dimensional model of framing has been constructed in order to compare the experiences of strategic urban projects in the current very dynamic context of multi-actor and multilevel governance: cognitive framing, framing alliances in the metropolitan action space and framing civic involvement. The empirical investigation of this model in seven of the largest urban projects under construction in European regions revealed that the three dimensions are more than just analytically separated in current practices. We found no empirical indications that cognitive schemes should be disqualified as being ‘rhetoric’. On the contrary, developing shared visions and discourses is serious business, certainly in the initial stages of project development. Negotiation of different interests into shared missions necessitates the search for inventive solutions; in some cases, even ‘intractable’ conflicts of opinion and interest are being resolved. Searching for shared frames of cognition is not in itself a problem as such. The crux of the problem, rather, is in the highly cognitive and conceptual character of strategic framing which seems to think that action will follow idea and vision if it is only articulated deeply enough. Here, we find some implications for the theoretical approaches of framing analysis. In its very active sense, cognitive framing analysis still appears to be extremely vulnerable for the Achilles heel of voluntarism. Of course, the visionary forces may set things in motion, in this respect it is a powerful part of the action game itself, but it would be too optimistic to expect the full world of action to follow the collective mindsets.

A further reflection on this conclusion may bring back to mind the distinction between Goffman’s frame analysis and the contemporary schools of framing analysis. Paradoxically, the ‘passive’ definition of Goffman’s frame analysis—examining the structural principles of organisation in the real world that condition the perceptions and representations of men—seems to pay more tribute to the world of action than the current ‘active’ framing approaches that emanate from the shared cognitions and the collective intentions of change. In the perspective of frame analysis, planning might be conceived as an act of reconstruction, as strategic action which actively responds to the world of thought and action that has evolved into structural principles of organisation over time. Framing analysis, in contrast, is not rooted in reconstruction but in construction and in the active mindsets of...
deliberate change in the immediate here and now. In its attempts to invent strategies of action based on shared cognition and intended change, it sometimes neglects to reflect and to respond on the real existing structures of action.

Notes

1. Notwithstanding the many differences between and within the two continents, in very general terms this goes both for the pro-growth coalitions in the 1950s, for the social polarisation of urban tendencies in the 1960s and for the new entrepreneurial cities from the 1980s and 1990s.

2. This happened with different time-intervals in the different member-states, the UK under Thatcher belonging to the category of the fastest, and France and Germany belonging to the slowest, to respond.

3. These are the Amager Common District, which lies between the two previously mentioned areas, and the West Amager District which will have a higher proportion of housing. The latter two districts will be developed in the coming five-year period.

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